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Abstract: The scope of the paper is to present the concept of the radical dyad of the 
“non-human,” in an attempt to think radical humanity in terms of Marxian mate-
rialism, which is the product of approaching Marx’s writings on “the real” and “the 
physical” by way of François Laruelle’s non-philosophical method. Unlike posthu-
manism, inspired by critical theory and the method of poststructuralism, the theory 
of the non-human, as a radical dyad of technology in the generic sense of the word 
(ranging from the techné of speaking a natural language to AI technology) and the 
organic understood as physicality, does away with anthropocentrism. Moreover, it 
does away with any anthropomorphology of thought, that is, it does away with any 
theorizing or philosophy that is centered on the notion of (human) subjectivity or, to 
borrow a Laruellian term, any “posture of thought” that is molded according to the 
structure of subjectivity centered thinking,
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1. The Radical Dyad of Automation and Physicality:  
A Non-Philosophical Introduction
The scope of this paper is to present the concept of the radical dyad of the “non-human,” an attempt to think radical humanity in terms of Marxian materialism, which is s the product of approaching Karl 
Marx’s writings on “the real” and “the physical” by way of François Laruelle’s 
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non-philosophical method. We are resorting here to the terms “the physical” and 
“the real” as the designations that appear in Marx’s texts far more often than “the 
material,” most probably due to his critique of the materialisms of his time as 
yet another form of idealism conditioned by their inability to move away from 
philosophy.1 Yet again, they do not serve to designate biology or living matter only 
but also the natural environment, the use value of manufactured objects, and so 
on, in short, everything physical in the sense of the material. Unlike posthuman-
ism, inspired by critical theory and the method of poststructuralism, the theory 
of the non-human as a radical dyad of technology in the generic sense of the 
word (ranging from the techné of speaking a natural language to AI technology) 
and the organic understood as physicality does away with anthropocentrism.2 
Moreover, it does away with anthropomorphology of thought, that is, a doing 
away of any theorizing or philosophy that is centered on the notion of (human) 
subjectivity or, to borrow a Laruellian term, any “posture of thought” that is 
molded according to the structure of subjectivity centered thinking (even if the 
semantics may differ).
Marx also operates with the notion of the real, oftentimes simultaneously with 
that of the physical. I have approached the concept found in Marx by means of 
Laruelle’s suspension of the “principle of philosophical sufficiency” (2013: 12, 77, 
99ff) that is, by way of exiting the vicious circle of philosophy legitimizing philoso-
phy and in that process positing and recreating the real (as existent, non-existent, 
relevant, irrelevant, as well as what is real and what an illusion). I have elaborated 
this proposal at more detail elsewhere (2019), aided by Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
structuralist linguistics, Luce Irigaray’s feminism rid of subjectivity centered 
discussion and inspired by Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism as well as by 
John Ó Maoilearca’s reworking of Laruelle’s human-in-human as the non-human.
Laruelle, not unlike Marx, argues that the thought that seeks to transcend the 
circularity of philosophy needs to submit to the real (2013: 24–31), but in order 
to do so it must abolish the very possibility of relationality between the two, i.e., 
between the real and thought. Thus one avoids the error of “amphibology,” of sub-
stituting truth for the real and the other way around, arriving at a unity of the two 
whereby what is real must also be true and vice-versa. The post-philosophical or 
non-philosophical thought must mime the scientific posture of thought whereby 
the thought submits to the always already foreclosed real, but this ontological 
foreclosure does not prevent the thought from seeking to “clone the real” (Laruelle 
2013: 51, 179). The real is not a substance, it is an ontological modifier or rather 
an epistemic category. It is in this sense that it is also “the one.” The unilaterally 
posited elements of the dyad lead to the latter “mechanically” producing sense, 
following the model of Saussure’ language (both as langue and langage). Drawing 
on Yuk Hui’s distinction between mechanicity and organicity (2019: 22–30), let us 
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note that under our Laruelle-Marx inspired lens, the two categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive in the present elaboration of the radical dyad that is the non-human.
Mechanicity is used here in the sense of techné, a craft of device making, of 
art and artificiality as in artifice-creation. I do not make recourse to it in a sense 
encumbered with an ontology or metaphysics of mechanistic causality, neither in 
the Cartesian sense and nor as a notion opposed to and in a mutually excluding 
relation with the notion of organicity. It refers to the materiality of the practice 
of signification conceived in the Saussurean sense: a phoneme gains meaning 
through its distinction (“relation” to) another phoneme, whereas the one serves 
merely to proffer that material distinction to the other. The choice of a phoneme, 
according to Saussure, is completely arbitrary. The other phoneme in the binary 
serves as a negation and as Schelling’ Hemmung (hinderance) referred to here as 
to an analogy rather than a fully adequate definition of the matter in question.
It is also similar to a certain degree to the formative limit discussed in Gren-
zsituationen philosophy, but also to the way the real is treated in some of the more 
recent strands of philosophy that could be associated with what is vaguely referred 
to as “speculative realism,” the Ljubljana school of psychoanalysis and feminism 
drawing on Kant. Namely, Drucilla Cornell (1992), Alenka Zupančič (2000), and 
myself (2014) have discussed the creative function of the limit as the conditioning 
real, to name a few authors from contemporary feminist philosophy that dovetail 
with the argument developed here. The status of finitude in Quentin Meillassoux’s 
work (2008) and the grounding nihil in Ray Brassier’s philosophy (2007) play a 
similar role as the conditioning limit and contingency that sets forth the genera-
tion of signification or grounds the plane of the transcendental.
Certain material characteristics are required in the Saussurean account of 
phonetics in order for the process of signification to commence and be maintained. 
They are contingent upon the phonetic system, e.g., a number of consonants to be 
divided by a vowel, the function of the “r” as a vowel depending on the phonetic 
environment, etc. The “relation” of the two phonemes is a non-relation since re-
lationality, philosophically conceived, seems to imply intentionality. The sounds 
are senseless random audial creations that begin to make sense only after the 
preconditions of material rules of sound grouping are met and on the basis of a 
material distinction from another sound or group of sounds. In spite of the fact 
that Saussure’s minimal structure is a binary, the binarity in question is neither 
dualism nor duality in any philosophical sense.
It is similar to François Laruelle’s radical dyad, a concept of duality that 
comes down to unilaterality—the two elements are positioned to one another 
as the indifferent numb and senseless real is to “thought.” If we accept the thesis 
that the human is a radical hybrid of physicality on the one hand and language 
or signification enabling subjectivation on the other hand, the physical insofar as 
devoid of language plays the role of the real at the heart of said dyad. This found-
362 Katerina Kolozova
ing estrangement is never sublated or transcendent through some philosophical 
unification but rather affirmed and, thus, the dyad is radicalized.
Thought seeks to relate (to) the real, relay it, inevitably transposing it onto 
the level of the transcendental, whereby the real remains foreclosed, indifferent. 
Laruelle’s preferred concept here is “thought” instead of “the thinking subject,” as it 
refers to the material reality or the practice of thought that would be unnecessarily 
antropomorphised by the introduction of the notion of subject. In other words, 
the intentionality to signify (of one of the phonemes or morphemes) is hampered 
by the other/opposing phoneme or morpheme and thereby made possible by 
the very limit or the real of the other sign, be it phoneme or a written trace. The 
unilateral relation within a binary conceived in structuralist terms and developed 
along the lines of Laruelle’s method of “dualysis,” a procedure of unilateralization 
pertaining to the radical dyad, can be compared but not reduced to Schelling’s 
notion of Hemmung, as discussed in Yuk Hui’s Recursivity and Contingency (2019), 
that leads the automation of signification (or information) to re-turn, revisit and 
overcome the hampering, in order to proceed with the circular process of signi-
fication (Hui 2019, 24).
Operating with Saussure’s notion of sign, I argue, therefore, that the dyad is 
radical or bereft of the possibility for a “meaningful unification of the two,” i.e., 
it is to be understood in the vein of Laruelle’s elaboration of the “radical dyad.” 
This inelegant, coarse reality, physicality-that-doesn’t-make-sense precedes and 
preconditions any artifice of making sense—any automation of signification. Think-
ing in terms of the radical dyad is determined in the last instance by the real’s 
foreclosure, and by way of rendering this realization a transcendental determinant 
or determination in the last instance of a second order—the only one with which 
thought can operate—and by thought’s vectoriality toward the real, albeit while 
unilaterally positioned within the dyad.
The radical dyad is radical insofar as it remains a dyad, precluding any subla-
tion, synthesis or unification. Each of its elements, however, operate unilaterally via 
one another, remaining one faced by a foreclosure and, therefore, acting as the real 
toward one another. The one of the elements is not the Other to the other element, 
because the Other proffers meaning and the Subject and the other unify in a truth 
that surpasses the split, even if this unity is declared to be a paradox. Meaning and 
making sense can happen only within the automation of making sense. In order 
to establish the automaton, the material preconditions of the radical dyad ought 
to be established. It is therefore an artifice, a mechanical design and such is the 
dyad between the automation (of making sense) or language and the physicality of 
the body, practice and material experiences of the non-human. The latter refers 
to the human stripped of its philosophical edification, and, thereby, 
underdetermined in Laruellian sense (2015: 24, 62; 2012: 30), defined in its last 
and least humanity.
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An operation of this sort exposes the radical dyad humanity is: the artifice 
of the signifying automaton (thought, and the projection of subjectivity), on the 
one hand, and the numb and coarse reality of human physicality or animality, 
on the other hand. As already noted, I have elaborated this thesis at length in my 
monograph of 2019, where I also establish a homology between this understanding 
of the notion of the non-human (inspired by Laruelle and corroborated by Marx 
and Saussure) and Donna Haraway’s cyborg.
According to such a postulation of (non-)humanity, and in line with Marx’s 
realism (or materialism) and its orthodox legacy, the non-human remains an ar-
tifice, a product of techné inside of which a unity enabled by a certain organicity 
remains impossible. The automation of signification and the automaton of physis 
(nature) inevitably establish a certain instance of organicity respectively, and I am 
making this argument in line with Yuk Hui’s interpretation of organicity as the 
product of contingency integrating recursivity. The edifice the human is, however, 
is a philosophical and an idealist creation, in the sense of the equation between 
philosophy and idealism established by Marx (1969: 421),3 and later on appropri-
ated and refashioned by Laruelle in particular in Introduction to non-Marxism 
(2014). The radical materialist (or non-Marxist in Laruelle’s sense) determination 
of the dyad affirms the materiality or the “physicality and reality” (in the sense of 
Marx’s original writings) of the dyad itself, of a (binary) unit that is never unified, 
and of the sense of a “split” or estrangement at the heart of the non-human. To 
affirm and embrace the materiality, physicality—expressed as “experience” that 
is somatic—of that founding estrangement entails the affirmation of the “real 
abstraction” alienation is, both socially and on the level of subject formation.
I argue that a Marx-inspired materialism necessitates the affirmation of the re-
ality of that originary estrangement of the non-human. I also argue that philosophy 
has always been in an obsessive search to cover up the traces of the embarrassing 
coarse reality of the radical dyad the non-human is. The embarrassment at issue 
engenders the philosophical reflex toward elevation into a unity that surpasses the 
dyad, toward transformation of the human into an idea, and thereof toward doing 
away with it all together and its embarrassing remnants of animality or physicality 
uninhabited by thought. I argue that this obsession of philosophy underpins its 
entire history and culminates in the worldview of modernity and, by consequence, 
in the capitalist reason itself. Philosophy in its post-enlightenment form and the 
political-economy of capitalism are two sides of the same coin the world (as we 
know it) is. In other words, we must address the metaphysics of capitalism if we 
want to address its political economy, which, in turn, is the prerequisite of tackling 
the problem of climate crisis that includes the threat to the survival of the life on 
the planet, folding in (non-) humanity, the animals, and other forms of life.
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2. Doing Away With “Human” and “Nature” as Philosophemes in 
Order to Arrive at Radical Humanity, Animality, the Physical, 
and a Materialist Account of Intelligence and Signification
If one seeks to circumvent the ultimately humanist dream of trans-humanism, 
one needs to epistemologically reposition assuming what Marx would call the 
“third party’s view” (Marx, 1959).4 The paragraphs that follow will attempt to 
elaborate the perspective of the third person Marx argues for. The perspective of 
a “third party”, is objective insofar as it mimes the position of the surrounding 
objects including the human subject’s externalized actions as objective realities, 
objectivities or objects if you will. It is not a positivist stance regarding objec-
tivity because the human “species-being” (Marx 1959: s.p.)5 is entangled in the 
“sensuous and the physical”, argues Marx (1959: s.p.),6 whereas social relations 
are “real abstractions,” to quote the Marxist epistemologist Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
(1978: 13–35). Therefore, an absolutely autonomous self, detached from its own 
and the surrounding materiality (the world, social relations and nature) ascending 
to a mind of pure science governed by “objective truths,” from a Marxist point 
of view (or Marx’s point of view) is impossible.
The phantasm of positivism is such that it is automatically precluded, rendered 
impossible from the viewpoint of any Marxian epistemology. Marx’s “third party’s 
view” based objectivity requires that the thinking subject treats itself as an object 
as well, to assume an imagined third party’s posture of thought. And the Marxist 
subject of scientific thought assumes a materialist view of its object, including one-
self as an object of study. Therefore, the presumed third party is material, physical, 
imperfect, its “view” is not that of a god’s perspective, be it the scientific human 
god of positivism or god in the theological sense. The third party’s perspective is 
situated beyond the subject/object binary. By way of postulating subjectivity as an 
object among objects, Marx does not erase subjectivity, does not discard it as the 
agency carrying out the activity or thought. Instead, he suggests that the subject 
mimes the structure and the status of exteriority of the object than the other way 
around. It is precisely the subject-centered thought that defines philosophy and 
precludes it from becoming a truly materialist science. That is why Hegel’s dialectics 
structurally fails, according to Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General:
Whenever real, corporeal human beings, humans with their feet firmly on 
the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, posits 
their real, objective essential powers as alien objects by their externalisation, 
it is not the act of positing which is the subject in this process: it is the sub-
jectivity of objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be 
something objective. An objective being acts objectively, and he would not 
act objectively if the objective did not reside in the very nature of his being. 
He only creates or posits objects, because he is posited by objects—because 
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at bottom he is nature. In the act of positing, therefore, this objective being 
does not fall from his state of “pure activity” into a creating of the object; 
on the contrary, his objective product only confirms his objective activity, 
his activity as the activity of an objective, natural being. (Marx 1959: 114)
Or put differently: To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time 
to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and 
sense for a third party, is one and the same thing. (Marx 1968: s.p.)7 It is for the 
same structural reasons that Marx rejects Feurebach’s materialism: its subjectivity 
centered thought betrays both idealism and philosophy and is, therefore, far from 
furnishing the exit from philosophy Marx’s scientific project seeks to achieve. 
Consider the following quote from German Ideology:
German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never quitted the realm 
of philosophy. Far from examining its general philosophical premises, the 
whole body of its inquiries has actually sprung from the soil of a definite 
philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in their answers but in their 
very questions there was a mystification. (Marx 1968: s.p.)
“Nature” is the same abstraction as “anthropos” that needs to be unraveled by 
arriving at its material or “concrete components” (Marx 1973: 41), only to yield the 
abstractions that define and explain it by way of being concepts, notions, produced 
as if by a third party. We will have to resort to Laruelle’s method of disassembling 
a conceptual unity—the “abstractions” that Marx problematizes—or a notion 
that is the product of the principle of philosophical sufficiency, such as “nature,” 
in order to arrive at the concrete or rather—at the “transcendental material,” 
constituting a chôra (a disorganized topos)—undergirded by the real (Laruelle, 
Marx) or the physical (Marx). By depleting Nature of the enlightenment and 
modern philosophy from the binding conditions of the principle of philosophical 
sufficiency, as per Laruelle, and, as a consequence, from its classical binaries such 
as nature/culture-or-technology, body/mind, animal/human, we might be able to 
arrive at the “concrete” and the determinations in the last instance that are of the 
physical insofar as the real.
By way of employing Laruelle’s method of unilateralisation, i.e., fashioning 
a concept (product of thought) that succumbs to the real and merely “clones” it 
or mimes it, we may be able to arrive at a determination in the last instance of 
the notion of “nature.” Conceiving nature in the manner of Aristotelian miming, 
Laruellian cloning or Wittgenstein’s Maßstab producing, translated as “scale ap-
plied to reality” (Wittgenstein 1922: 2.1512), we arrive at a concept that is not 
far from the one that natural sciences operate with—it is, in the last instance, the 
organic that can be defined in compatible ways by evolutionary biology, chemistry, 
neurosciences to name a few. In rare examples, we find nature underpinned by or 
reducible to the organic such as in Schelling and other philosophers as interpreted 
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by Yuk Hui in his Recursivity and Contingency but also in some critical theorists 
and contemporaries like Donna Haraway.
The determination of the last instance is a “clone” of the real, in line with the 
vocabulary and the method elaborated by Laruelle in his Introduction to Non-
Marxism (as explained and referenced above), and that real should not be an 
abstraction in the philosophical sense, an all-unifying generalization endowed 
with a telos in the sense of causa finalis. It is for that reason that we refer to nature 
as the organic because it clones the most radical (i.e., of the last instance) concept, 
embedded in philosophical chôra unilaterally related to the real of physis—the 
external reality that sustains itself in life and systemic co-organization indepen-
dently from human intervention.
The o rganic i s e nabled b y r ecursion t hat i ntegrates c ontingency a nd, a s a  
consequence, retroactively assigns “meaning” or purpose and function to the ac-
cident—the Aristotelian tuché—integrating it in its auto-regulating system. This 
reading of how the organic operates is proffered by Yuk H ui in his Recursivity 
and Contingency (2019), revealing the fact that, “ontologically” speaking, nature 
(physis) or the organic and technology insofar as automaton rather than mēkhanḗ 
both rely on the principle of recursivity and its folding in of contingency. I have 
put inverted commas around ontological, because, by subscribing to Laruelle’s 
project of non-standard philosophy (also called non-philosophy), I am also 
subscribing to the thesis that the notion of tò ón (τὸ ὄν) or the Being is the 
cornerstone of the problem of the principle of philosophical sufficiency: it is the 
amphibology of thought and the real par excellence, the grounding principle of 
any philosophi-cal truth that is supposed to be not only transcendental but 
also immanent, and therefore, it has to be not only an act of cognition but also 
an act of a creation of reality, the kind of thought that renders the real more 
real than the mere real bereft of meaning, signification, purpose.
Science describes and explains the world around and within us. Philosophy, 
however, produces truth—a form of reality superior to the numb, meaningless real 
that is a simple “out-there.” Truth is the amphibology of thought and the real and its 
concept of origin is precisely “the Being” or tò ón (τὸ ὄν). Considering Hui operates 
with concepts that originate in science, applies them on “philosophical material” 
by way of describing very concrete processes in order to infer an abstraction that 
can be considered a quasi-ontological principle—but not necessarily ontological 
and not necessarily the only explicatory principle—I would be inclined to use the 
term “ontological” only tentatively or non-philosophically. The movement from the 
concrete to the abstract can be ascribed to Marx—his analysis of the capital—as 
well as to Saussure and his structuralist linguistics, which, in turn, enables the 
identification of the determination of the last instance (Laruelle 2013: 25, 26, 25, 
30) or a radical concept (Kolozova 2009).
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If Hui, following Shelling, is correct, then we can conclude that, in terms of a 
physicalist or materialist analysis, the organic in the sense of nature and artificial 
automation are underpinned by the same organizational or structural principle. 
Not to fall prey to the philosophical temptation to identify an immanent link be-
tween technology and the organic, between “nature” and “culture,” let us reaffirm 
the thesis presented at the beginning: the dyad remains radical because of the real’s 
foreclosure, and, therefore, thought performs unilaterality always already and un-
avoidably. If so, a certain techné of signifying that is materially carried out and is 
mechanical prior to becoming organic—producing sounds in a natural language, 
producing tools that extend the bodily possibilities, crafting “real abstractions” 
(Sohn-Rethel) that are the social relations—is required.
Nature itself, prior to building the organic processes of recursivity Hui dis-
cusses, undergoes rather mechanical material processes in order to arrive at the 
structure that can be explained chemically as a formation of carbon, hydrogen, 
nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus and sulfur (CHNOPS). Tedious materiality and 
mechanical nature of these processes are something always already intersected by 
the principle of recursion that re-integrates contingency, chance and error into a 
system that renders it functional, assigns its “purpose.” This thesis echoes Marx’s 
interpretation of the role of clinamen or chance in Epicurus materialist account 
of atomism. Consider the following quote from his doctoral thesis:
Once again Epicurus stands directly opposed to Democritus. Chance, for 
him, is a reality which has only the value of possibility. Abstract possibil-
ity, however, is the direct antipode of real possibility. The latter is restricted 
within sharp boundaries, as is the intellect; the former is unbounded, as is the 
imagination. Real possibility seeks to explain the necessity and reality of its 
object; abstract possibility is not interested in the object which is explained, 
but in the subject which does the explaining. The object need only be pos-
sible, conceivable. That which is abstractly possible, which can be conceived, 
constitutes no obstacle to the thinking subject, no limit, no stumbling-block. 
(Marx 1975: 44)
Contingency is the opposite of purpose, necessity, law, regularity or simply 
of “making sense.” Recursivity as a principle appears precisely in order to create 
sense out of the nonsense of irregularity. It deals with the object and its position-
ality within the objective realm, the organic resorts to recursion and creation of 
purpose out of the senseless in order to sustain itself in life. Similarly, the artificial 
signifying chain rests on the principle of recursivity for the purposes of sustaining 
the automaton of signification. As Yuk Hui points out, the purpose is circular and 
there is no telos other than that of the organism sustaining itself, my paraphrase, 
or in his own words:
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The natural end is something that cannot be observed objectively. We can 
see such and such a tree or such and such an animal, but we cannot grasp 
nature as a whole through mechanical rules. Reason can only understand 
the natural end through reflective judgment, meaning that it recursively ar-
rives at a self-organizing being. Teleological thinking is in this sense circular: 
A→B→C→A’. (Hui 2019: 41)
The coarse action that is at first mechanical provides the foundation and the 
occasion for recursion. Let us note that in his doctorate as well as in his later writ-
ings Marx points to subjectivity’s role of being the organizing principle of thought 
as the main source of idealism, philosophical circularity or what Laruelle calls 
“the principle of philosophical sufficiency.” If recursion functions as sublation of 
some sort, it is still very different from any idealism or idealist telos and a synthesis 
created along the lines of any teleology. The material error necessitates a material 
action that is possible only due to an abstracted “form” or principle of structuring.
Once again, let us compare it to Saussure’s discussion of the concrete and the 
ideal phoneme, in order to recognize the materialist principle underlying the “real 
abstraction” of language:
For the first time we have broken away from abstraction. Now for the first 
time we have found the concrete, irreducible units that occupy a place and 
correspond to a bent in the spoken chain: p was nothing except an abstract 
unit linking the common characters of p> and p<, the only units that actually 
exist. In the same way, the still higher abstraction of “labiality” links together 
P, M and B. We may speak of P as if it were a zoological species; there are 
male and female representatives of the species, but there is no ideal speci-
men. Before, we had been singling out and classifying the abstractions; but 
we had to go beyond the abstract to reach the concrete. Phonology made a 
great mistake in considering abstractions real units without examining more 
carefully the definition of the unit. (Saussure 1959: 53)
Just as Marx demonstrates in Capital that value as abstraction is determined 
in the last instance by matter or “physicality” (estranged through wage labor), 
so does Saussure prove that the ideal (and scientific) concept of a phoneme is 
an abstracted notion determined and made possible by the “aberrations” of the 
imperfect, “concrete” and physical realities of phonemes. The signifying automata 
of value-exchange or of natural languages are materially determined.
The transcendental, if understood as product of language or the human 
signifying automaton, is therefore fashioned thanks to material operations. That, 
however, does not imply that a new level of reality has not been created, one that 
ought to be viewed as radically severed from or unilateral vis-à-vis the real (insofar 
as pre-signified). Let us recall Laruelle’s critique of the principle of philosophical 
sufficiency: in order to escape the vicious cycle of philosophy’s self-mirroring, 
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one assumes a posture of thought that avows the real’s radical indifference to the 
signifying process as it is in no way involved in it, due to the radical foreclosure 
of the real.
Philosophically put, the immanent is always pre-conceptual and it can par-
ticipate in the signifying process as its enabling material support, thus establishing 
a unilateral continuity with the transcendental. Yet again, it remains radically un-
involved in the signifying process, in sharp discontinuity with the transcendental. 
This radical estrangement at the heart of the continuity is what determines the 
human insofar as the grounds of its subjectivisation or individuation are concerned. 
It can be signified, mediated by the transcendental but it cannot be transposed 
or transformed into the signifying chain and its effects, a unification of the two 
culminating into a transcendental synthesis is impossible. It is yet another instance 
of the real that remains radically foreclosed insofar as it is that thing which always 
already precedes signification (the material the transcendental is made of). The 
“cyborg” (in Donna Haraway’s sense) humanity remains a radical dyad whereas 
the recursion of the signifying automaton concerns its own continuous perfection 
insofar as a unilateral instance.
Nature, when viewed through originally non-philosophical categories such as 
“physicality” outside the determining limits of philosophy as in Marx, or recursiv-
ity as in the case of Yuk Hui’s reading of German idealism and, finally, Laruelle’s 
disentanglement of the notion from any spontaneous philosophical humanism 
thanks to the operations of unilateralization and superposition in En dernière 
humanité (2015), is not opposed to “culture” or “technology.” Such opposition is 
impertinent and the binary is false. In the epistemic approach I have presented 
here, the only binary we can operate with is that of the radical dyad of the physical 
(including the organic) and the signifying automaton.
3. Conclusion about the False Opposition  
and the Emergency of Preserving Nature
To present “nature” (or physicality) as something opposed to technology, onto-
logically inferior to mind, “reason” or “the Spirit,” is to act in a “philosophically 
spontaneous way,” as Laruelle would put it (2013: 29, 31, 70, 85, 126). To adhere to 
the pretension to excarnate “reason” or “intelligence” from the physical or nature 
in a way that undervalues materiality is to naively put animality, the physical or 
the material on the side of the non-intelligent and to overstate intelligence as a 
self-sufficient form of reality in no need of material basis. It betrays a symptom 
of the “principle of sufficient philosophy” in a way that is always already non-
materialist or perhaps anti-materialist. To operate with notions such as “Reason” 
as well as “Nature,” is to remain entrapped in philosophical givens that are, to 
paraphrase Marx, abstractions insofar as generalities or Allgemeinheiten (1973: 
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41, 95, 106). Such abstractions are in fact, argues Marx, generalisations in the 
sense of philosophical unities or ensemblismes as termed and problematised 
by Laruelle (2018: 43, 51) that have not been determined by their concrete and 
material elements (Marx 1973: 41, 95).
In order to arrive at an abstraction that is underpinned by its concrete, 
physical or material determinants, one needs to subject the elements of such 
generalisation to an examination that produces abstractions of the constituting 
particularities and retroactively or recursively constitute a materially grounded 
abstraction (Marx, 1973: 41). For example, “capital” is but a generalisation un-
less recursively reconstituted as an abstraction derived from the abstractions of 
concrete determinants such as “wage labour,” “money,” “value,” etc. (Marx 1973: 
41). This circular move from the abstract to the concrete in order to arrive back 
at the abstract that is determined in the last instance by the concrete establishes 
a perfect homology with Saussure’s method, as I attempted to present it above. 
“Reason” and “nature,” as philosophical givens, are of no use to the sciences and in 
particular those that comprise the field of cognitive science (with the exception of 
philosophy that is part of it), unless reduced to notions susceptible to the scrutiny 
of cognitive psychology (Clore 2011: 325–38), evolutionary biology or comput-
ability and, thus, intelligence as “utility” (Russell 2019: 16–17, 20–27). Consider 
the following remark by psychologist Gerald L. Clore:
“Rationality” is not a concept in current use in psychology. Psychologists find 
the term ambiguous in its meaning and value-laden. In common usage, being 
“rational” is assumed to be good, whereas being “irrational” or “emotional” 
is assumed to be bad and to lead to error. Psychological science, however, is 
primarily interested in understanding rather than in passing judgment on 
kinds of thought processes. (Clore 2011: 325)
The discussions in terms of such classical philosophical oppositions remain 
an anachronistic academic decorum to the pertinent techno-scientific debates. 
This oftentimes unintentional atavism is unavoidable due to the fact that the 
epistemes of said philosophical disputes are subjectivity-centered, in the sense 
problematized by Marx, as I presented at the beginning of this paper. Subjectiv-
ity as the organizing principle of thought is the cornerstone of all philosophical 
reasons, which both Marx and Laruelle find impeding to any true materialism or 
realism, proposing the solution of the (non-positivist) objectivism of “the third 
party view” and breaking with “the principle of philosophical sufficiency” respec-
tively. The classical philosophical opposition between the categories at issue is in 
its essence anthropocentric.
Let us take a detour from the epistemic backdrop I adhere to in my argumen-
tation, and resort once again to Yuk Hui’s philosophical argument that not only 
bridges the divide between philosophy and science but also manages to extrapolate 
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an onto-epistemological foundation from science and technology and juxtapose 
it to philosophy.
Nature is recursive; in it one can find reciprocity between parts and the whole. 
However, recursivity is not only a natural phenomenon; it is also a technical 
thinking, or what Douglas Hofstadter calls a “strange loop.” With recursivity, 
algorithms are able to domesticate different forms of contingency in order to 
render them useful. The relation between technics and contingency must be 
analyzed materially and historically; these relations reflect dominant scientific 
epistemologies (Hui 2019: 236)
Hui’s discussion begins with philosophy, gradually knitting his argument with 
insights from technology and natural sciences in order to arrive at the conclusion 
that not only is the opposition between nature and technology untenable (Hui 2019: 
269), but also that the “search for the separation between thinking and organic 
life” is in fact a “negative organology, or an extreme humanism” untenable (Hui 
2019: 269). Consider the following passage:
What we are witnessing today, since the advent of cybernetics, is the devel-
opment of an inorganic organicity stretching through every smart device 
and multiple levels of systemic organization. They cease to be the merely 
organized inorganic but rather are becoming the organizing inorganic, which 
functions recursively to produce its own structures and patterns. Recursivity 
is a thinking that enters into all orders of magnitude—for example, synthetic 
biology. Recursive algorithms are employed to conceptualize the reproduction 
of DNA-RNA-protein. Or as a researcher in synthetic biology has put it, after 
having referred to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie: “Synthetic biologists aim to 
enhance and transgress nature by using nature’s self-organization principles, 
in short: transgressing nature by harnessing nature! They conceptualize na-
ture as a kind of technology or, more specifically: as a universal engineer.” 
(Hui 2019: 236)
Materialism transforms all subject of examination into a postulated object, 
including subjectivity itself. Let us recall the operations of the “third party perspec-
tive” promulgated by Marx as I elaborated at the beginning of the present article. 
They enable us to treat “humanity”—or non-humanity, i.e., its non-philosophical 
rendering—as an object among objects, and its materialist treatment enables a 
thought that does not dispense with humanity simply because it has been axiologi-
cally “surpassed.” There is no linear telos, and the organic telos works recursively, 
as argued by Yuk Hui. Therefore, automated technology can only recursively revert 
to the physical in order to maintain the circular telos of humanity seen in the 
non-humanist sense, as postulated in the present article. The more technological 
the more recursion to the physical contingency transformed into a “necessity” or 
simply put in use as per a materialist conception of the process.
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Only romantic humanism can yield a techno-nihilism as it is but a glance 
from a Grenzsituation humanist position of thought. The fact that the “infinite” 
technological expansion is seen as something presupposing the transcendence 
of humanity can be a product of humanist subjectivity centered ontology. A ma-
terialist non-anthropocentric view is not immersed into musings as to whether 
humanity would or would not be surpassed as nature is being surpassed and 
“perfected” by automated reason. Material underpinnings of reason—which is 
always already automated, beginning with natural languages—intimate a false op-
position, as argued above, as well as a false hierarchy and an erroneous judgment 
about the obsoleteness of “nature” (or physicality and the organic). Phantasms of 
desired extinction, the suicidal drive of contemporary post-continental philosophy, 
betray a romanticism of 19th century philosophical existentialism. These traps 
are unavoidable unless subjectivity centered reason as the organizing principle 
of philosophy is abandoned. Moreover, the principle of philosophical sufficiency 
that produces the amphibology of thought and the real needs to be abandoned if 
we are to arrive at a scientific practice of philosophy. These concluding passages 
are not intended as refutation of any particular philosopher or philosophy but are 
instead meant as a dialogue with a range of ideas that can be found in different 
strands of posthumanism, transhumanism, theories of singularity, rationalisms of 
different and contemporary sorts as well as scattered notions that could be identi-
fied in scientific, artistic, and political conversations of our time.
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Notes
1. This problem is discussed in his Theses on Feuerbach, The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
in General, German Ideology and elsewhere. Cf. Marx 1969: 421 and passim.
2. Such “theory” is hardly one of a legacy—or, to my best knowledge, of any adher-
ents—but rather a project I have developed more thoroughly elsewhere, building 
not only on Laruellle and Marx but also on Ferdinand de Saussure, Luce Irigaray, 
Donna Haraway, John Ó Maoilearca to mention the most prominent influences. It 
is a non-philosophical (in Laruellian sense) experiment with philosophical material, 
complemented with linguistics and “material” from cognitive sciences; cf. Kolozova 
2019).
3. Marx 1969: 421: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of 
Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in 
the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as a sensuous human activity, 
practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active 
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